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Abstract 
Typically, the participation rate is below 100 per cent. In this paper pecuniary compensation is 
used to increase the participation rate. In a postal questionnaire to 5,000 people invited to screening for 
colorectal cancer, those not participating were asked “would you participate if you were given NOK X 
in compensation?” The results show that compensation increases participation and that the 
participation probability systematically varies with travel expenses, income, age, county, native 
country, marital status, use of health care services, genetic predisposition, expected benefit from the 
screening, subjective health status, and education. The estimated costs per additional screening are 
increasing. 
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1. Introduction 
New medical methods to prevent and detect cancer at an early stage have potential benefits in 
reducing pain, suffering, and treatment costs. In particular, the introduction of screening programmes; 
i.e. mass-examination of individuals without symptoms, has been the subject of quite a lot of attention 
during the last few years. The rate of participation in screening programmes is typically below 100 per 
cent. Here the purpose is to examine whether a pecuniary compensation influences the participation 
rate in screening for colorectal cancer. If costs and gains are reasonably balanced and/or the incidence 
of cancer is higher among those not participating than among those participating (see Hoff et al., 1985 
and Walker and Whynes, 1991), organisers could be motivated to take measures to increase the 
participation rate. 
  We formalise a model explaining the individual’s choice to participate in screening for 
colorectal cancer when the individual is offered a pecuniary compensation given that the individual 
did not choose to participate when first invited. The estimation is conducted in two steps. First, we 
estimate the participation probability for the screening when the compensation is zero. Second, we use 
the estimated results from the first step to estimate the participation probability for the screening when 
compensation is introduced. Both steps are undertaking by using a binary probit. The results show that 
pecuniary compensation increases the rate of participation significantly. In addition we find that the 
participation probability is higher; the higher income and age of the individual; or if the individual 
lives in Telemark, was born in Norway, visited his/her GP 2-5 times during the last year, has a genetic 
predisposition, is married or has a partner, has a greater expected benefit from the screening, or is 
more highly educated (except for very high education). Participation is lower the higher the travel 
expenses and among those reporting their subjective health to be poor or very poor. Using the 
estimated results we predict the increase in the participation rate for different levels of compensation. 
This procedure shows that the participation rate increases from 62 to 72 per cent if offered NOK 200 
in compensation. The costs of this increase amounts to NOK 5,306 per additional screened individual.   
Previous research on screening and participation analyse various invitation systems. Wardle et 
al. (2003) find the participation rate to be higher given a brochure relatively to a standard invitation.   4
Cole et al. (2002) find a higher participation rate among individuals who receive an invitation signed 
from their GP.
1 Walker and Whynes (1991) find that more impersonal approaches reduce 
participation. In addition, there is a potential benefit with regard to gained life years of increasing 
participation, since prevalence increases with age and participation decreases with age. Studies of 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for colorectal cancer screening are closely related to our study. Frew, 
Wolstenholme and Whynes (2001) studied the WTP for two types of colorectal cancer screening. They 
show that WTP is influenced by factors like gender, income, age, risk perception, illness experience 
and health beliefs.  
  This article proceeds as follows; Section 2 discusses the decision to participate in screening 
for colorectal cancer. In 3 we present the theoretical model, and in 4 the empirical specification of the 
model is presented. Data and estimated results are reported in 5 and 6 respectively. In section 7 we 
predict the increase in participation and in section 8 we estimate the total costs of increasing 
participation and the costs per additional screening. We end the discussion with some concluding 
remarks in section 9. 
 
  
2. The participation decision in screenings for colorectal cancer 
Screenings are mass-examinations of individuals who have no symptoms of a specific illness. 
One criterion for a mass-examination is that the disease has a relatively high incidence rate, which is 
the case for colorectal cancer, being the most common type of cancer in Norway. Gyrd-Hansen et al. 
(1997) has described the progress of cancer and how it is affected by screening, see figure 1. Cancer 
has a biological onset. Normally, without screening, the cancer is first detected on the basis of 
symptoms. The starting point of the symptomatic phase is the time of diagnosis due to symptoms. 
Screening makes it possible to detect and prevent cancer in the asymptomatic phase, also referred to as 
the sojourn time. The starting point of the sojourn time is defined as the time when it is possible to 
detect colorectal cancer with a screening method. This point may depend on the sensitivity of the test, 
                                                 
1 Several other analyses are presented in Vernon (1997)   5
while the right endpoint, i.e. start of the symptomatic phase, may depend on the natural history of the 
disease, i.e. how it progresses. The earlier cancer is detected, the shorter the delay time, which is the 
time from the starting point of the sojourn time to the time that the screening test detects cancer. 
Earlier detection of cancer also increases the lead time, i.e. the amount of time by which a diagnosis is 






  From 1999 to 2001 NORCCAP (Norwegian colorectal cancer prevention, see Bretthauer et al. 
(2002)), the first screening for colorectal cancer was carried out in Norway. Ahead of NORCCAP, 
there had been a pilot study which was important for the choice of design of the NORCCAP study, see 
Hoff et al. (1985). Two counties were represented in NORCCAP, Telemark (165,855 inhabitants in 
2003), where the pilot study was carried out, and Oslo (517,401 inhabitants in 2003). Oslo represents a 
typical urban area, while Telemark has both urban and rural areas. NORCCAP is a once-only 
screening, and the screening-methods used were flexible sigmoidoscopy (FS) and faecal occult blood 
tests (FOBT)
2. Half of the intervention/screening group was offered FS and the other half a 
combination of FS and FOBT. FS enables the physician to observe the inside of the large intestine 
from the rectum through the distal part of the colon (about 50 cm of the total colon), called the 
sigmoid colon. This procedure makes it possible to look for polyps
3, being early signs of cancer. The 
FOBT test is self-administered and requires stool samples on three consecutive days. Samples are 
smeared onto cards containing chemically impregnated paper and returned to the laboratory at the time 
of screening participation. There were some exclusion criteria in the study. Individuals under treatment 
for cancer and individuals using anticoagulants were, for instance, excluded. 
                                                 
2 The FOBT used here is a FlexSureOBT®, an immunochemical test for human blood. 
3 Polyps are outgrowths in the colon. The greater they are, the more likely they are to develop into cancer in the 
future.   6
The expected benefits from screening for colorectal cancer are an increased probability of 
surviving cancer and a reduced number of future incidences. The first effect is due to earlier detection 
of cancer since colorectal cancer often is diagnosed at a very late stage, which is negatively correlated 
with the survival probability. The second effect is connected to the removal of polyps from the colon 
which could develop into cancer in the future. 
 
 
3. Demand for screening for colorectal cancer 
In this section the choice of whether to participate or not in a screening for colorectal cancer is 
analysed in a simple analytic model. This enables us to study factors that are important to the 
individual when making the decision. We assume a two period model, where the choice to participate 
in a screening for colorectal cancer is made in the first period and where the medical outcome is 
realised in the second period. The participation decision depends both on known and uncertain factors. 
For instance, compensation, the time spent travelling to the screening centre and travel expenses are 
known by certainty, whereas examination discomfort and medical outcome are uncertain. The 
individual therefore makes a decision based on expectations. The known costs of participation amount 
to a negligible part of the income, i.e. consumption will not be affected by the choice to participate. 
Since the screening is performed during the asymptomatic detectable stage of the disease, the 
individual is assumed not to have known colorectal cancer when she
4 makes her decision to 
participate. The utility is therefore independent of perceived health state in period 1, while it depends 
on the perceived health state in period 2. How screening influences the probability of staying healthy 
in period 2 is important when the individual decides whether to participate or not. In the analysis we 
only include reduced future incidences of colorectal cancer. It is here assumed that screening does not 
affect severity. 
j q  (where j =P, N) is the perceived probability of staying healthy in period 2. 
Superscript j refers to the choice;  j = P indicates that the individual participates and j = N that she 
does not participate. 
P q  is expected to increase (or remain constant) as a result of the screening.   7
Hence, 
P N qq ≥ , i.e. the perceived probability of staying healthy in period 2 when participating can 
never be smaller than the perceived probability of staying healthy in period 2 when not participating. 
How much the perceived probability of staying healthy will increase as a result of participating in the 
screening, will differ from individual to individual due to different expectations. The expectations can 
be influenced by personal characteristics and information about the population probability of getting 
colorectal cancer. Due to uncertainty about the health outcome in period 2, we use a setup based on the 
expected utility theory. We assume that 
 
12 2 [( 1 ) ]
P PP h P s EV v r q a q a =+ + −                             (1) 
22 [( 1 ) ]
NN h N s EV r q a q a =+ −              ( 2 )  
  
where  1
P v  is a vector of participation specific factors in period 1, such as travel time and expenses, and 
compensation, and can therefore take both positive and negative values.  2
d a  (where d = h, s ) 
represents the change in utility of staying healthy or getting colorectal cancer in period 2. Superscript 
d refers to the health state;  d = h indicates that the individual is healthy and d = s that she has 
colorectal cancer. When the individual stays healthy in period 2, we assume that the utility increases, 
2 0
h a > , whereas if the individual gets colorectal cancer we assume no change in utility,  2 0
s a = . r is 
the discount factor,  [0,1] r∈ , indicating that future effects are given less weight for lower values of 
r . Using the assumption above and equations (1) and (2), we can find the difference in expected 
utility between participating and not participating.  
 
12 ()
P NP h PN EV EV v ra q q −= + −                                (3) 
 
The first term in (3) represent the participation specific factors in period 1. The second term reflects 
the expected discounted health benefits from screening in period 2, and is a product of the discount 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 We refer to the individual as “she”   8
rate, the increase in utility of staying healthy, and the change in perceived probability of staying 
healthy between participating and not participating.   
 
 
4. Empirical specification of the model 
The factors that influence the participation decision in the analytic model are both known and 
uncertain. Participation-specific factors in the first period,  1
P v , are travel time, travel expenses, and 
compensation all being known to the individual. Other factors are unobservable to the researcher, such 
as expectations about the screening itself including stress and whether or not the screening is expected 
to be uncomfortable. The expected discounted health benefits from screening are given by the product 
2()
hP N ra q q − . We do not observe the factors of this product directly, but this product can be 
represented by suitable instrument variables. An individual who believes she will benefit from 
screening can be expected to have a greater positive change in the perceived probability of staying 
healthy if she participates than an individual who does not think the screening will have any effect, see 
Sutton et al. (2000). The levels of and changes in perceived probabilities are also assumed to depend 
on the level of knowledge about cancer. This correlation may be due to the fact that an individual with 
relatives who have a history of cancer is more informed about the true risk in the population and 
expected change in the probability. Another explanation could be that she is more afraid of getting 
colorectal cancer and will do anything to reduce the probability of getting it. The difference between 
the perceived probability of staying healthy when participating and not participating will then increase, 
see Petersen (2002), Harewood et al. (2002) and Vernon (1997). Socio-economic variables like 
education, income and wealth are assumed to be positively correlated with the discount factor, and 
will therefore increase the difference in expected discounted utility, see McCaffery et al. (2002), 
Peterson (2002) and Vernon (1997). We assume that the difference in expected utility can be 
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where  * α  is an unknown parameter, 
P
i k  is a pecuniary compensation that the individual is offered if 
she decides to participate.  * β  is a vector of unknown parameters and  i X  is a vector of the 
explanatory variables; including the travel time, travel expenses, perceived benefit of screening for 
colorectal cancer, number of family members with a cancer history, income and education. σ  is a 
positive unknown parameter. The size of σ  determines how much of the variation in the dependent 
variable that is explained by the systematic part and the stochastic part of the model. When σ →∞  
the variation in the model will be totally stochastic, and when  0 σ →  the model will be deterministic, 
i.e. all variation is explained by the systematic part.  i ε  is a random term that accounts for 
misspecification and the effect of unobserved variables, such as embarrassment. The random term is 
assumed to be standard normally distributed  (0,1) N ∼ .  M is the number of individuals in the 
analysis. Without loss of generality we can normalise equation (4) by dividing both sides with σ , 
which gives us  
 
ˆˆ PNP








== .  
 
The individual chooses to participate when  ˆˆ 0
PN
ii EV EV − ≥ , which is when the difference in 
expected utility is greater than or equal to zero.  
To take account of selection biases in the data set we adjust for the fact that only individuals 
who did not participate, answered our hypothetical question about compensation. This is done by 
estimating the conditional probability of accepting compensation, i.e. the probability of accepting 
compensation given that the individual did not participate when first invited (when compensation was   10
zero).
 The estimation is carried out in two steps
5. First, the probability of participating when first 
invited is derived, i.e. for compensation equal to zero. Let 
 











The participation probability when first invited is defined as 
 
(1 | )( ) ii ii PY X PXβ ε == ≥ −                                                                                               (6) 
 
Since the random term is normally distributed, we can use a probit model and write the cumulative 
probability of participating in the screening as:  
 
(1 | )() ii i PY X Xβ == Φ                                                               (7)   
 
where  (.) Φ  denotes the standardised cumulative normal distribution. The parameters in (7) can be 
estimated by the maximum likelihood method. We then maximise the probability of the chosen model 
fitting our observations. One can conveniently express the log likelihood functions as 
 
log ( ) (1 )log(1 ( ))  ii i i
ii
LogL Y X Y X β β =Φ + − − Φ ∑∑                                               (8)     
 
In the second step we use the estimated coefficients from (8) to estimate whether pecuniary 
compensation increases participation in the screening among those individuals who did not participate 
when first invited. Let 
 
                                                 
5 It is also possible to estimate this probability simultaneously, but that procedure is much more complicated. 
The theoretical specifications are reported in the appendix.   11












The probability of accepting compensation given that the individual did not participate when first 
invited (compensation equal to zero), is defined as 
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where the numerator is the joint probability that the individual did not participate when first invited 
and accept compensation. The denominator is the probability that the individual is in the sample, i.e. 
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where the only change from equation (9) is the numerator on the right hand side, which is the 
participation probability when compensation increases from zero to 
P
i k . From the assumption that the 
















                                                                                               (11) 
 
where  i Q  is the conditional probability of accepting compensation given that the individual did not 
participate when first invited.  (.) Φ  denotes the standardised cumulative normal distribution. The 
parameters in (11) can be estimated by the maximum likelihood method. One can conveniently 
express the log likelihood functions as   12
 
log log (1 )log(1 ) ii i i
ii
LZ Q Z Q =+ − − ∑∑                                                (12)  
 
In summary; in the reduced form specification we have assumed the following correlation 
between the explanatory variables and the individual’s participation probability: 
•  Compensation increases participation. 
•  Longer travel time and higher travel expenses reduces participation. 
•  Increased income and education increases participation, see McCaffery et al. (2002), Peterson 
(2002) and Vernon (1997). 
•  Increased expected benefits from the screening increases participation, see Sutton et al. 
(2000). 
•  Increased number of family members with a cancer history increases participation, see 
Petersen (2002), Harewood et al. (2002) and Vernon (1997). 
  
In addition, we believe that the following variables may affect the individual’s choice of 
participating as well: 
•  We would expect individuals from other countries than Norway to have a lower participation 
probability than Norwegians. This would be due to problems of informing them because of 
language difficulties.  
•  Marital status is assumed to be an important factor in health decisions. Living in a relationship 
with a spouse or partner is supposed to increase the participation probability. For this group 
the costs associated with screening are lower relative to total income than for those living 
alone. In addition, living in a relationship may motivate the individuals to take action in order 
to increase their probability of staying healthy because their utility is positively correlated with 
each other.  
•  The effect of subjective health on the participation probability is expected to depend on the 
level of health. Those who are in very bad health may not have the energy to participate in a   13
screening. Especially if they think their condition is unrelated to colorectal cancer. Those who 
report a very good health condition may not participate because they fail to see the need for 
treatment, see McCaffery et al. (2002).    
•  Number of visits to their GP during the last 12 months and number of hospitalisations during 
the last 5 years are both indicators of the individuals’ need for health care services. This effect 
may be strongest for the number of hospitalisations, since hospitalisations are rationed by the 
GP. We would therefore expect that the participation probability is reduced as the number of 
hospitalisations rises. The individuals decide themselves when they want to consult their GP, 
and the number of visits can also indicate how inclined the individual is to visit the GP and 
health care services in general. This assumption indicates an increased participation 
probability with increased numbers of visits to the GP during the last 12 months.          
•  Women are expected to participate more often than men, because they are more inclined to 
use health care services. In addition, the introduction of mammography screening may have 
increased their knowledge about cancer and the importance of early detection, see Petersen 
(2002), Sutton et al. (2000) and Vernon (1997).  
•  We would expect that participation in the workforce says something about socio-economic 
status, i.e. we would expect individuals who work to participate more often than those not 
working, see McCaffery et al. (2002).    
•  Age is assumed to have a positive effect on the participation probability, see Petersen et al. 
(2002). 
•  We also expect individuals living in Telemark to have a higher participation probability. This 
claim is supported by three arguments. Firstly, the individuals may have heard about the 
screening through the pilot study. Secondly, half the population is invited, indicating that the 
probability of knowing someone else who is invited is high. Finally, the screening in Oslo will 
be one of many health care activities the individuals can be offered.     14











ρ =−                                                                                        (13) 
 
where L* is the log likelihood from the estimation, and  0 L  is the log likelihood if the choice was 
totally random, i.e. all the parameters are zero. Two extreme situations can occur. Firstly, if 
2 ρ =1 
(σ=0) the covariates explain all the variation in the data i.e. no uncertainty in the preferences. 
Secondly, if
2 ρ = 0 the deterministic part of the model has no predictive power. This information will 
be used in the empirical testing of how well the model fits the data. 
We shall estimate different model specifications, and in order to decide which one to choose, 
we apply the likelihood ratio test. A typical null hypothesis  0 () H  is that there are specific constraints 
on the parameter values. For examples, several parameters may be equal to zero. Let  ˆ H β  denote the 
constrained maximum likelihood estimate obtained when the likelihood is maximised subject to the 
restrictions on the parameters under  0 H . Similarly, let  ˆ β  refer to the unconstrained maximisation of 
the likelihood. Let  ˆ ()
H β    and  ˆ () β    denote the log likelihood values evaluated at  ˆ H β  and  ˆ β , 
respectively. Let f be the number of independent restrictions implied by the null hypothesis. Under the 
null hypothesis we then have 
 
() ˆˆ 2( ) ()
H β β −−                 ( 1 4 )          
 
which is asymptotically chi-squared distributed with f degrees of freedom. Thus, if 
() ˆˆ 2( ) ()
H β β −−     is large, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
                                                 
6 This measure has been proposed by McFadden.   15
5. The data 
  From the year 1999 to 2001, 7,000 persons were invited, 3,500 from each county. In 1999 and 
2,000 persons between 55 and 64 years were invited, while persons between 50 and 54 years were 
invited in 2001. The participation rate in 1999 and 2000 was 66 per cent, but fell to 62 per cent in 
2001- 65 per cent for the whole period. Our analysis consists of data from the screening in 2001, i.e. 
persons between 50 and 54 years. In co-operation with Statistics Norway a postal questionnaire was  
sent to 4,998 of those invited to the screening. The questionnaire contained questions about travel 
time, travel expenses, use of health care services, health condition, knowledge about cancer and 
participation in the workforce. Earlier experiences (see Aas, 2004) had shown lower response from 
those who did not participate. To ensure the best possible analysis we decided to include all those who 
did not participate (2,628 people), then all the people who participated after receiving a reminder (933 
people), and finally a random sample of those who participated without a reminder (1,437 people). 85 
per cent of those participating answered the questionnaire and 45 per cent of those not participating. In 
addition to the questionnaire, we obtained information about age, county of residence, gross income 
and education from Statistics Norway.  
The data-set originally consisted of 3,116 observations but this figure was reduced to 2,918 
due to missing information about education (27 individuals), and the fact that 171 individuals had 
answered the questionnaire incompletely. Rather than excluding observations where the individual had 
failed to report information about travel time and travel expenses, we replaced the missing value with 
the median value for individuals living in the same county. In Oslo the median travel time was 1.35 
hours and in Telemark 1.77 hours (145 individuals). Median travel expenses were NOK 40 and NOK 
60 for Oslo and Telemark respectively (333 individuals). The income measure used in the analysis is 
personal gross income. We see from table 1 that participants had shorter travel time, lower travel 
expenses, higher income and about the same age as those not participating.   
 
 






Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis. We see that perceived 
benefit tends to be a strong indicator of participation, as participation increases with perceived benefit. 
There is a small tendency of men participating more often than women. Participation tends to increase 
with more visits to a GP, expected benefit from the screening, genetic predisposition, and level of 
education, except for the highest education level. If the individuals are working, living in Telemark, or 
are natives of Norway, participation will increase. With the exception of individuals with very good 
health, participation decreases as health declines. Participation also decreases with an increased 
number of hospitalisations. Married individuals and widows/widowers participate more often than 
unmarried, separated or divorced individuals, and cohabitants. 
Since only individuals who did not participate when first invited were asked the question 
about compensation, these individuals constitute the sample when we in the second step estimate the 
effect of compensation on the participation probability
7. The sample was originally split into four 
random subsamples. Each sample was allocated only one size of money and asked the hypothetical 
question “would you participate if you were to get NOK X in compensation?” They had the choice of 
answering “yes”, “no” or “do not know”. In the estimation we have only included those who answered 
“yes” or “no”, i.e. excluded 330 individuals who answered “do not know”. Furthermore, the sample 
was further reduced as a result of 136 individuals not providing complete answers. The sample is 
therefore reduced to 627 individuals. The percentage distribution of those answering “yes” and “no” is 
reported in table 3. 
 
 
(Table 3)   17
Except for the category NOK 1,000, there is a tendency towards a higher acceptance rate the 
larger the sum offered is. Meanwhile, we see that a large proportion accepts even when the 
compensation is at the lowest point (NOK 200).  
 
 
6. Estimation and results  
We estimate the empirical model in section 4 by using TSP 4.5. The estimation was carried 
out in two steps. First, we estimated the probability of participating in the screening. At this point the 
compensation was zero. In the second step we used the estimated coefficient from the first estimation 
to estimate the effect of compensation on the participation probability, given that the individual had 
not participated when first invited. Results from both steps in the estimation are reported jointly in 
table 4. Three different models are presented. In model 1 we include only variables we believe are the 
most important determinants for the decision to participate. In model 2 we test the stability of model 1 
by adding only significant variables. In model 3 we estimate a full model with all the factors that we 
believe may affect the choice of participation. 
From table 4 we see that compensation has a significantly positive effect on participation in all 
three specifications. In addition, we find (in all models) that the participation probability is lower with 
higher travel expenses, if the individual expected no benefit, little or very little effect of the screening
8, 
and increases by:   




•  living in Telemark 
•  higher levels of education, except for the highest level
11. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 Descriptive statistics in this dataset are reported in the appendix. 
8 Identical with findings in Sutton et al. (2000). 
9 Identical with findings in McCaffery et al. (2002), Peterson (2002) and Vernon (1997). 
10 Identical with findings in Peterson (2002). 
11 Identical with findings in McCaffery et al. (2002), Peterson (2002) and Vernon (1997).   18
(Table 4) 
 
In model 2 and 3 the participation probability is also lower if the individual reported subjective health 
as poor or very poor
12, and higher if the individual:  
•  was born in Norway 
•  visited a GP 2–3 times or 4–5 times during the last year 
•  is married or lives together with a partner 
•  has 1, 2–3  or 4 or more family members with a cancer history
13.  
 
The results are stable across the different model specifications.  
The goodness-of-fit is measured by (13). We calculate 
2 ρ  to be 0.20 in model 1 which means 
that the model explains the data 20 per cent better than if the individual is assumed to make a purely 
random choice (0.23 in model 2 and model 3). Hence there are systematic dependencies between 
characteristics of an individual and the individual’s choice of accepting compensation. Still, the 
random part of the model plays an important part in the choice process. Using the log likelihood ratio 
test to choose the best specification, we find that model 1 is rejected in favour of model 2, which in 
turn is rejected in favour of model 3 (rejected at a p-value of less than 0.005).   
  The share of correct predictions is another measure for the preciseness of the model 
specification. The numbers are reported in table 5. We see that the sensitivity of the “yes” prediction is 
0.89 (1,728/1,937) and the specificity is 0.46 (456/981). This indicates that the model does, on 
average, predict “yes” and “no” correctly in approximately 81 per cent of the cases. The positive 
prediction value in the model is 0.77 (1,728/2,253), which indicates that we on average predict more 




                                                 
12 Identical with findings in McCaffery et al. (2002).   19
7. Predicting changes in the rate of participation 
The individual was confronted with only one hypothetical sum of compensation in the 
questionnaire. An individual, who did not accept NOK 200 in compensation, however may have 
chosen differently had she been offered NOK 1,000 in compensation. Similarly, an individual who 
accepted NOK 500 in compensation may have chosen to participate with only NOK 200 in 
compensation. We can use the estimated results from table 4 and predict the level of compensation 
required for the individual to be indifferent between participating and not participating, i.e. where the 
expected discounted utility is equal for the two choices. When equation (5) equals zero, we find the 
value of 
P
i k  which determines the point where the individual is indifferent between participating and 





ii i kX β ε
α
=− +                  ( 1 5 )  
 
The compensation can only be positive, since the individual would have chosen to participate when 
first invited if the compensation had been smaller or equal to zero. We want to use the results from the 
estimated model to predict the probability of accepting a screening invitation given different sums of 
compensation. This will enable us to estimate the costs of increasing the participation per additional 
screening. The probability of an individual accepting a pecuniary compensation less than y in order to 
participate, can be defined as 
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13 Identical with findings in Petersen (2002), Harewood et al. (2002) and Vernon (1997).   20
Since  i ε  is standard normally distributed, which is a symmetric distribution,  i ε −  is also standard 
normally distributed. The cumulative probability distribution can be represented with the probit 
model:  
 
(| ) ( )
P
ii i Pk y X y X α β ≤= Φ +          ( 1 7 )  
 
Using (17) we can find the share in the population requiring compensations between  and  yy y +∆  to 
participate 
 
(| ) ( | ) ( | )
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We estimated the predicted participation probability for given levels of compensation by using 
the model in equation (9) and the estimated coefficients from model 3 in table 4. From equation (18) 
we can compute how much the probability changes with increased compensation for each individual. 
In order to aggregate the result (obtain the unconditioned expectation), we add up the change in 
probability for all the individuals and estimate the average change. From table 6 we see that the 
predicted probability reaches 62 per cent when the individual is offered NOK 500 in compensation. To 
increase the probability to 84 per cent, we have to offer NOK 2,000. We derive the change in the 
predicted participation probability by finding the change in predicted probability for two different 
levels of compensation.
14 We see that the change in predicted probability is not linear and has no 





                                                 
14 The change in the predicted participation probability is derived as follows: For compensation equal to NOK 
50: 0.533 – 0; for NOK 100: 0.543 – 0.533 etc.    21
20,780 individuals were invited to participate. Since 12,960 participated, the rate of participation is 
equal to approximately 0.62, i.e. a share of 0.38 did not participate without compensation. We know 
that 0.45 of those not participating answered the questionnaire. From table 6 we see that 0.62 are 
predicted to participate with a compensation of NOK 500. In this case, the total increase in 
participation is equal to: 0.38 * 0.45 * 0.62 = 0.106. Total participation will then be 0.726. This 
procedure assumes that we can only persuade individuals who answered the questionnaire to 
participate in the screening. Hence, the maximal participation rate can never be increased with more 
than 0.17 (0.38*0.45), i.e. to a total rate of participation of 0.79. 
In order to better illustrate the results, we have calculated changes in the predicted probability 
for different sub samples. In doing that we have used the average values of the following variables: 
Travel time, travel expenses, income, age, and number of hospitalisations during the last 5 years. In 
addition we have assumed that the individual is a man, married or has a partner and has an 
intermediate level of education. For all the examples the estimation was carried for a compensation 
level equal of NOK 500. In the 8 predictions we have varied the variables; county, native country, 
genetic predisposition, subjective health, number of visits to the GP during the last 12 months, and 




All the variables seem to affect the predicted probability to a great extent. the estimated probability 
varies from 0.061 to 0.914, indicating that it is easier to persuade some groups to participate than 
others. For instance, an individual living in Oslo, born in Norway, not working, with 2–3 family 
members with a cancer history, no use of GP during the last year, reporting very poor health and 
expecting very little benefit from the screening has an approximately eight times smaller probability of 
participating relative to if he used the GP 4–5 times during the last year, reports good health, is 
working, and expect very much benefit from the screening.  
 
   22
8. The costs of increasing participation 
To estimate the costs, we use numbers from the NORCCAP Annual Report 1998 – 2001. The 
estimation of the costs of increasing participation includes: 
 
1.  Compensation both paid to those who are willing to participate without compensation and to 
those who need compensation in order to participate. Both groups must be compensated; 
otherwise very few would choose to participate when first invited, if they know that they can 
receive compensation by waiting. Compensation may cover all losses incurred by 
participation.  
2.  Incremental costs related to increased numbers of screenings of NOK 2,683 per screened 
individual
15. 
3.  Incremental costs related to increased numbers of colonoscopies. There are 0.3 colonoscopies 
per screening and the costs amount to NOK 248 per screened individual
16. 
4.  Travel costs of NOK 90 per individual on average among those not participating when first 
invited. 
 
Using the assumptions from 1 – 4 we can specify the total cost function 
 
(20780 (20780*0.38*0.45* ))







       ( 1 9 )  
 
where TC is total costs, k is pecuniary compensation and  k γ is the predicted increase in participation 
for a compensation level of k
17. We have used the results from table 6 and assume that only those 
answering the questionnaire can be encouraged to participate. We derive the change in participation 
                                                 
15 Estimated by use of accounting data from the NORCCAP annual report. 
16 Estimated by use of accounting data from the NORCCAP annual report. 
17 The number of invited was 20,780. Increased participation is equal to (NOK 200 as an example): 
0.38*0.45*0.561*20780=1993.   23
from the predicted probabilities in table 6.
18 The change in total costs is estimated the same way as the 
change in participation. The costs per additional screening are derived by dividing the change in total 






From the table we see that the costs per additional screening are increasing. Offering the individuals 
NOK 200 in compensation leads to costs of NOK 5,306 per additional screening. Increasing the 
compensation to NOK 500 increases participation by 196 individuals. The costs per additional 
screening related to offering a compensation of NOK 500, are NOK 38,375. 
 
 
9. Concluding remarks 
We have shown that compensation increases the participating rate in screenings for colorectal 
cancer. In addition we show that an individual’s participation probability increases with; higher 
income; age; living in Telemark; being born in Norway; having visited a GP 2-5 times during the last 
year; being married or having a partner; a higher expected benefit from the screening; genetic 
predisposition, a higher level of education (except for very high education). Participation is lower with 
higher travel expenses and among those reporting their subjective health to be poor or very poor. We 
use the estimated results to predict the participation probability for different levels of compensation. 
Offering the individuals NOK 200 in compensation increases participation from 62 to 72 per cent, and 
results in costs of NOK 5,306 per additional screening. 
It is assumed that only those answering the questionnaire can be encouraged to participate, and 
we have therefore applied the most cautious estimate. Assuming no selection bias in the data set 
reduces the costs significantly. If we offer the individual NOK 200, the participation rate increases 
                                                 
18 The change in predicted probability; NOK 200: 1993 – 0, NOK 500: 2189 – 1993, etc.    24
from 62 to 83 per cent, i.e. 4,429 individuals will decide to participate and the costs per additional 
screening will be reduced to NOK 4,159.  
The relevance of our findings depends, among other things, on the individual’s actual 
behaviour being identical to her reported answer. Would the individual actually participate if she were 
confronted with the same pecuniary compensation as in the questionnaire? We know from 
environmental economics that individuals who were confronted with their WTP for improved 
environment did not actually pay the sum they had reportedly been willing to pay (see Seip and Strand 
1992).  
  The true benefits of the screening, i.e. number of life years gained, is another factor that is 
important before compensation can be recommended as an appropriate measure. In the next few years 
we will be able to analyse and find the real effect of screening on the incidence of colorectal cancer in 
Norway. This will be possible as we are developing a data set where we track the individuals invited 
to the screening, together with a control group.  
Regardless of the true benefits, the government should also evaluate other possible measures 
and their respective costs. In our analysis we find that a large share of those asked is encouraged to 
participate at a relatively low level of compensation. Does this indicate that they are just happy to get a 
“second chance”? If this is true, a second reminder or another invitation would be enough to make 
them participate. This would certainly be less expensive. Or, since many report “unable to go” as their 
most important reason for not participating when first invited, a more flexible appointment system 
may be a solution. A flexible appointment system may include extended opening hours and more 
administrative staff who contact the individuals by telephone in order to give them the opportunity to 
find the best possible time for the screening. In NORCCAP the individuals themselves could change 
their appointment. Since 12,960 out of 20,780 participated, this indicates that the administrative staff 
would have to contact 8,040 individuals. At a first glance this method seems less expensive, but we do 
not know the true effect on the rate of participation. These last two examples just illustrate other 
possible measures to evaluate in order to increase participation in screenings. In a future research 
project it would be interesting to test for different follow-up strategies. 
                                                                                                                                                         
19 For instance for NOK 500: 12,711,405/196 = 38,375.   25
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Appendix  
A1: The joint probability 
The joint probability of accepting compensation and not participating when first invited is defined by: 
 
1 if  0
0 otherwise













=+ < + + >
 
 
(0 ,  1 | )( 0 ,   0 )
P
ii i i i i i i PV W X PX k X βε α βε === + < + + >       ( 2 0 )  
 
Using the results from the empirical specification in section 2.2, the parameters in (6) can be estimated 
by the maximum likelihood method. We then maximise the probability of the chosen model fitting our 
observations. One can conveniently express the log likelihood functions as 
 
log log ( )
             (1 ) log[ ( ) ( )]
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables according to participation and non-
participation in the screening. M = 2,918. 
Participating Not  participating  Variable 
Mean St.dev Mean St.dev 
Travel  time  (hours)  1.46 1.80 1.72 2.42 
Travel expenses (NOK)  73.17  141.78  114.20  492.01 
Income (NOK)  406,775  1,519,455  306,347  296,371 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for categorical variables according to participation and non-
participation in the screening. M =  2,918.  
Variable Category  Participating  Not  participating 
Perceived benefit   
Very much 
Much 

































Education in years  
 
 
Low  (0 – 10) 
Intermediate (11 - 14) 
High (14 – 19) 




















No of visits to GP last year   
0 
1 
2 – 3 














No of hospitalisations during the 




2 – 4  











Subjective health   
Very good 
Good 















Genetic predisposition   
0 
1 
2 – 3  
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Table 3: Acceptance of an economic compensation and participation, numbers in per cent
20. M = 627 
Compensation Yes  No  N 
NOK    200  0.47  0.53  154 
NOK    500  0.48  0.52  156 
NOK 1,000  0.39  0.61  162 











































                                                 
20 1 NOK is approx. 0,137$.   33
Table 4: Estimated coefficients and their effect on the probability of participating in the screening for 
colorectal cancer. The coefficient for compensation is estimated in the second step (M=627), whereas 
all the others are estimated in the first step (M=2,918). Standard error in brackets.  
 Variable  Explanation  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Compensation    
0.572 (.025)***  0.585 (.025)*** 0.585  (.025)*** 
       
Constant    
-1.592 (.937)*  -1.612 (.952)* -1.695  (.957)* 
Travel time    
-10.389 (6.89) -10.113  (6.91) -  9.769  (6.91) 
Travel expenses    
-0.513 (.157)*** -0.415  (.160)*** -0.401  (.161)*** 
Income    
2.936 (.960)***  1.834 (.915)** 1.834  (.923)** 
Perceived benefit 
(ref. very much) 
 
Much 
















Gender   
Women 
 
-0.017 (.053) -0.037  (.055) -0.045  (.056) 
Age   
50 to 54 
 
0.383 (.173)** 0.410  (.175)** 0.405  (.176)** 
County   
Telemark 
 
0.263 (.053)***  0.212 (.055)*** 0.217  (.056)*** 
Education in years  
(ref. low (0-10))  
 
 
Intermediate (11 – 14) 
High (14 – 19) 











Native country   
Not Norway   -0.125  (.070)* -0.130  (.070)* 
No of visits to GP last 
year (ref. 0) 
 
1 
2 – 3 
4 – 5 










the last 5 years (ref. 0) 
 
1 
2 – 4 























(ref. very good) 
 
Good 
Neither good nor poor 
Poor 











2 – 3  
4 or more 









Working   
Not working    -0.269 (.073)*** -0.269  (.073)***   34
Log likelihood 
21    
1,608.14  1,564.40 1,559.95 
2 ρ  
22   
0.20 0.23 0.23 
***significant at a 1 per cent level 
** significant at a 5 per cent level 











































                                                 
21 Log likelihood for the estimation of the probability of participating in the screening. 
22 McFaddens 
2 ρ  represent the estimation of the probability of participating in the screening.   35
Table 5: Number of correct and incorrect predictions from the estimated model 3 (step 2), sensitivity 
and specificity. M = 2,918. 
  Predicted: Yes  Predicted: No  Total 
Reported decision: Yes   1,728  209  1,937 
Reported decision: No  525  456  981 
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Table 6: The predicted participation probability for different 
levels of compensation. 
Compensation (NOK)  Predicted 
participation 
probability 
Change in predicted 
participation probability 
     50  0.533  0.533 
   100  0.543  0.010 
   200  0.561  0.018 
   500  0.616  0.055 
1,000 0.702 0.086 
2,000 0.842 0.140 
4,000 0.975 0.133 
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Working   Expected benefit  Predicted 
probability    
Oslo Not 
Norway 
0  0  Very poor health  No  Very little benefit  0.061 
Telemark Not 
Norway 
0  0  Very poor health  No  Very little benefit  0.092 
Oslo  Norway  0  0  Very poor health  No  Very little benefit  0.078 
Oslo  Norway  2 – 3  0  Very poor health  No  Very little benefit  0.116 
Oslo  Norway  2 – 3  4 – 5  Very poor health  No  Very little benefit  0.171 
Oslo  Norway  2 – 3  4 – 5  Good health  No  Very little benefit  0.350 
Oslo  Norway  2 – 3  4 – 5  Good health  Yes  Very little benefit  0.440 
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Change in total 
costs (NOK) 
Costs per additional 
screened (NOK) 
  200  1,993  1,993   10,575,453  10,575,453     5,306 
  500  2,189    196   18,096,969    7,521,516    38,375 
1,000  2,494    305   30,808,374  12,711,405   41,677 
2,000  2,992    498   56,582,832  25,774,458   51,756 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables according to accepting and not accepting 
compensation. M = 627. 
Accepting compensation  Not accepting compensation  Variable 
Mean St.dev Mean St.dev 
Travel time (min)  99.0  77.2  87.4  116.3 
Travel expenses (NOK)  104.4  197.8  85.7  267.7 
Income  (NOK)  317,260 319,846 319,908 325,952 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics for categorical variables according to accepting and not accepting 
compensation. M =  627. 
Variable Category  Accepting Not  accepting 
Perceived benefit   
Very much 
Much 

































Education in years  
 
 
Low  (0 – 10) 
Intermediate (11 - 14) 
High (14 – 19) 











Reason for not participating   
Delayed – unable to go 
Time expenditure 
Small gain from screening 
Uncomfortable examination 
Loss of income 
Opening hours 
Recently done a FS 
Postpone the examination 
Didn’t receive an invitation 



































No of visits to a GP last year   
0 
1 
2 – 3 














No of hospitalisations during the 




2 – 4  









Subjective health   
Very good 
Good 















Genetic predisposition   
0 
1 




































Working   
Yes 
No 
 
0.47 
0.44 
 
0.53 
0.56 
 
 